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Abstract 
The size of banks is examined as a determinant of bank risk. A wide range of banks 
are examined across four regions, including Australia, Canada, Europe and the USA. 
Four risk metrics are considered including Value at Risk (VaR), Conditional Value at 
Risk (CVaR, which measures risk beyond VaR), Probability of Default (PD) using 
Merton structural methodology, and Conditional Probability of Default (CPD, the 
author’s own model which measures risk based on extreme asset value fluctuations. 
Daily equity and asset value fluctuations are included in the analysis, including pre-
GFC and GFC periods. In addition to examining size in isolation as a determinant of 
bank risk, the paper uses fixed effects panel data regression to examine the 
significance of size as a risk determinant in conjunction with a range of other 
independent variables. The study finds mixed results among the four regions with no 
conclusive evidence of significant association between size and risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The question addressed is whether there is association between the size of a bank and 
its risk. Prior studies have mixed findings as to determinants of bank risk (using risk 
measures such as share price volatility and default), with independent variables 
including a variety of balance sheet and profitability items. Several studies consider 
diversification of bank income sources as a determinant of bank risk (for example, 
Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 2006; Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 2002; De Young & 
Roland, 2001; Saunders & Walter, 1994; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh & 
Rumble, 2006). Other studies find that balance sheet and income statement items or 
ratios provide little explanation of bank risk, and that changes in volatility and default 
are often caused by external shocks or contagion. Several studies have considered the 
contagion aspect (for example, Das, Duffie, Kapadia, & Saiata, 2007; Davis & Lo, 
2001; Giesecke & Weber, 2004, 2006; Jorion & Zhang, 2007; Liao & Chang, 2010; 
Lonstaff & Rajan, 2008; Rosch & Winterfeldt, 2008). There are also some notable 
studies which look at determinants of bank capital (Gropp & Heider, 2009; Kuo, 
2003; Ngo, 2008; Rime, 2001) which have common independent variables to those 
used by the abovementioned studies of determinants of bank volatility and default. 
Although we focus predominantly on one of these variables (size), in addition to 
investigating whether there is correlation between size (on it’s own) and bank risk, 
we examine whether size, in conjunction with other variables, is a significant 
determinant of bank risk. We examine the period from 2000 - 2008, and also split our 
analysis between pre-GFC and GFC to see whether ‘major’ banks fared better or 
worse during different economic circumstances as compared to smaller banks. 
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Four regions are examined; Australia, Canada, US and Europe.  We have chosen 
these 4 regions as this mix provides us with two distinctively different banking 
industry characteristics. Australia and Canada are smaller global regions, both of 
which are considered to have fared relatively well during the GFC, with banks 
remaining profitable and well capitalised. The USA and Europe, on the other hand 
are the largest two banking regions, both of which had substantial problems during 
the GFC, with many banks experiencing losses and shortages of capital.   
We use four measures of risk. The first two measures (explained in section 2) are  
Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR, which measures extreme 
risk beyond VaR). The other two measures (explained in Section 3) are Probability of 
Default (PD) based on Merton’s structural model, and the authors’ own Conditional 
Probability of Default (CPD) model, which applies CVAR techniques to the 
structural model to measure extreme credit risk. Following explanation of our risk 
measures in Sections 2 and 3, data and methodology are discussed in Section 4, 
results in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. VaR and CVaR 
VaR’s use in the banks escalated since adoption by Basel as the primary measure for 
calculating market risk capital requirements. The metric measures potential losses 
over a specific time period at a given level of confidence.  Internationally, there is 
extensive literature coverage about VaR. Examples include RiskMetricsTM (1994, 
1996) who introduced and popularised VaR, Jorion (1996), and comprehensive 
discussion of VaR by more than seventy recognised authors in the VaR Modeling 
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Handbook and the VaR Implementation Handbook (2009a, 2009b). In summary, 
there are 3 methods applied for calculating VaR. The Variance-Covariance 
(parametric) method estimates VaR on the assumption of a normal distribution. The 
Historical method groups historical losses in categories from best to worst and 
calculates VaR on the assumption of history repeating itself. Monte Carlo Simulation 
simulates multiple random scenarios. In order to exclude the possibility of distortion 
of results due to sensitivity to the method chosen, we use all 3 methods.  
As the parametric method assumes returns are normally distributed, to obtain VaR for 
a single asset X, all that needs to be calculated is the mean and standard deviation (ơ). 
Using standard distribution tables, and given the normal curve assumption, we 
automatically know where the worst 1% and 5% lie on the curve: 95% confidence = -
1.645ơx  and 99% confidence = -2.330ơx. When calculating VaR, it is usual practice 
(as used by RiskMetrics) to not use actual asset figures, but the logarithm of the ratio 
of price relatives (the ratio between today’s price and the previous price): 






1
ln
t
t
P
P
     (1) 
The historical method calculates daily asset returns the same way as the parametric 
method per equation 1. Instead of assuming a normal distribution, the actual 5
th
 
percentile value is taken as VaR at 95% confidence level. Because historical 
weightings in a portfolio can change, distorting current portfolio VaR, it is usual 
practice to use historical simulation whereby the value of the portfolio is calculated 
assuming constant weightings (based on current portfolio weightings, for which we 
use market capitalisation) for each day in the period.    
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Monte Carlo analysis generates future simulated prices, assuming a random walk. 
Using closing prices, mean and standard deviation of returns, thousands of random 
variables are generated (we use 20,000) which are then used to calculate VaR, with 
the 95
th
 lowest value in the simulation being VaR at the 95% confidence level.      
A key criticism of VaR is that it says nothing of  risk beyond VaR. Critics include 
Standard and Poor’s analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) due to inconsistency 
of VaR application across institutions and lack of tail risk assessment. Artzner, 
Delbaen, Eber, & Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have undesirable mathematical 
properties; such as lack of sub-additivity. Criticism of VaR mounted since the GFC 
onset with VaR perceived as focussing on historical risk and not measuring  tail risk.  
In addition to VaR, this paper examines CVaR which considers losses beyond VaR. 
If VaR is calculated at 95%, CVaR is the average of the 5% extreme returns. Pflug 
(2000) showed CVaR to be a coherent measure, not containing the undesirable 
properties of VaR.  CVaR has been used in an Australian setting by Allen and Powell 
(2007), who find significant correlation between VaR and CVaR in ranking risk 
among Australian sectors prior to the GFC and  Powell and Allen (2009) who use 
CVaR to show how relative risk changed among sectors since the onset of the GFC.  
  
3. DD, CDD, PD and CPD 
The prior section explained VaR and CVaR which we use to measure market risk, a 
key component of asset price fluctuations. These in turn, are important to measuring 
distance to default (DD) and probability of default (PD) using the Merton structural 
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methodology. The Merton model is based on the option pricing methodology of 
Black & Scholes (1973). The model uses fluctuations in market asset values 
combined with asset and debt levels of a firm to measure DD (measured by number 
of standard deviations). The firm defaults when asset values fall below debt levels.  
In the Merton model, equity and the market value of the firm’s assets are related by:  
)()( 21 dFNedVE
rT     (2) 
 
Where E = market value of firm’s equity, V = market value of firm’s assets, F = face 
value of firm’s debt,r = instantaneous risk free rate, N = cumulative standard normal 
distribution function, and T = selected time horizon 
T
rFV
d
v
v

 )5.0()/ln( 2
1

      (3) 
 
Tdd v 12       (4) 
 
 
σv is the standard deviation of asset returns. Volatility and equity are related under the 
Merton model as per equation 5, with DD calculated as per equation 6: 
vE dN
E
V
 )( 1





       (5)              
T
TFV
DD
v
v

 )5.0()/ln( 2

  
  (6) 
µ = an estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets, which can be 
calculated as the mean of the change in lnV (Vassalou & Xing, 2004).  
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Probability of Default (PD) can be determined using the normal distribution. For 
example, if DD = 2 standard deviations, we know there is a 95% probability that 
assets will vary between 1 and two standard deviations. There is a 2.5% probability 
that they will fall by more than 2 standard deviations. Using N as the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function, PD is measured as: 
)( DDNPD        (7) 
Moody’s KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) is a popular model used by banks to measure 
PD. KMV calculates DD based on the Merton approach, but instead of using a 
normal distribution to calculate PD, KMV use their own worldwide database to 
determine PD associated with each default level. In KMV, debt is taken as the value 
of all short-term liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all long 
term debt outstanding. T is usually set as 1 year. The approach to calculating σv, as per 
KMV and Bharath and Shumway (2008) and (Vassalou & Xing, 2004) involves first 
estimating σ of equity from historical data (as we have done in section 3), and then 
applying an iterative procedure. An initial asset value can be estimated as  








FE
E
EV                    (8) 
For each trading day, V is computed by applying σE to equation 5. Thus we obtain 
daily values for V every day. The daily log return is calculated and σ of asset returns 
calculated, which is then used as V for the next iteration to estimate new asset values. 
This process is repeated until asset returns converge to 10E-3. Once we obtain the 
converged value of σV, we back out V through equation 2. 
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 We use the same definition as KMV for debt and also set T to 1 year. We also use 
same iterative process as described above for estimating σv. In line with Vassalou and 
Xing (2004), we calculate µ as the annual mean of change in lnV. The risk free rate 
used is the annual average 1 year indicative mid rate for selected Commonwealth 
Government securities as provided by the Reserve Bank of Australia (2009). 
We have modified the Merton model to incorporate a CVaR approach due to the fact 
that firms are most likely to default under extreme circumstances. Instead of using the 
standard deviation of all asset returns, we use the standard deviation of the worst 5% 
of returns (which we label CStdev) to calculate conditional distance to default (CDD) 
and conditional probability of default CPD (default conditional upon asset values 
fluctuating at the extreme 5% level): 
TCStdev
TFV
CDD
v
v )5.0()/ln(
2 
     (9) 
and 
)( CDDNCPD        (10) 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Having explained the VaR, CVaR, DD and PCD metrics, this section now proceeds 
to explain our data selection, and how these metrics will be used in this study. 
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4.1. Data 
We examine all listed banks in each of the four regions for which there is sufficient 
data (a minimum of 5 years, giving 2 years in the GFC period and at least 3 years pre-
GFC) on Datastream.  
Although there are 58 banks in Australia, only 13 are Australian owned banks 
according to APRA (with assets of AUD $2.3 trillion totalling 88% of all banking 
assets in Australia), the remaining 12% being foreign bank branches. At 2008, the 
ASX showed 12 listed banks with Macquarie was classified ‘Diversified Financials”. 
We include Macquarie, due to being classified as a bank by APRA, giving 13 entities 
in total. St. George is now owned by Commonwealth Bank, but we include this 
separately, as it was a separately listed bank to end 2008. These 13 entities include 
the 4 ‘major’ banks and 9 smaller / regional banks.    
Although there are over 8,000 banks in the US In the US per FDIC (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 2009),  only 52 are US owned listed banks, with assets of 
USD 7.8 trillion representing about 65% of total US bank assets. The remaining 
entities are smaller commercial banks, mutual savings banks or branches / offices of 
foreign banks. The 5 dominant banks are JP Morgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Wells Fargo, and US Bancorp, with Total Assets of $5.8 Trillion representing close to 
half of the total US banking market. We include all 52 banks in our analysis.  
Listed European banks for which there is sufficient data amount to 75 banks 
(aggregate assets equal to USD 35 trillion), with representation from the UK, France, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. Europe (including the UK) 
has extremely large banks with several European banks featuring among the world’s 
10 
largest 15 banks (including Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse, 
DeutscheBank, ING, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Societe Generale, Unicredit 
and UBS). 15 of the world’s largest 25 Banks are European, with these banks having 
Total Assets of $30 trillion, nearly double the combined assets of all the banks in the 
3 other regions (US, Australia and Canada) compared in this study.   
As per figures obtained from Office of the Canadian Superintendant of Financial 
Institutions (2009) there are 22 domestic Canadian banks, 9 of them being public 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock exchange. The ‘Big 5’ banks (Royal Bank of 
Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, and 
Canadian Imperial Bank) have total assets of USD $2.4 trillion, approximately 80% 
of the total Canadian domestic banking market. We include all 9 listed banks 
(including the ‘big 5’ and 4 smaller banks) with total assets of USD 2.5 trillion, 
representing approximately 80% of total bank assets in Canada.    
We obtain daily equity prices from Datastream. We also obtain required balance 
sheet data from Datastream for calculating VaR, CVaR, DD and PD as described in 
Sections 3 and 4. This includes daily market capitalisation (used in calculation of 
daily asset values and for weighting banks to calculate VaR and CVaR); annual total 
liabilities, current liabilities and long term liabilities (used in calculation of DD).   
In addition to examining the entire period from 2000-2008, we also split data into a 
pre-GFC period and a GFC period. The GFC period is two years from 2007-2008  
and the pre-GFC period is the 7 years from 2000 – 2006 (7 years aligns with Basel 
Accord Advanced credit risk requirements).  
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4.2.  VaR and CVaR Methodology 
We use all 3 VaR methodologies (parametric, historical and Monte Carlo simulation) 
as described in Section 3. We calculate returns using the logarithm of price relatives 
every day for each year. For total bank portfolios, we use an undiversified approach, 
whereby total VaR is the weighted average of individual bank VaRs. As we are 
examining VaR and CVaR of equities, we weight each bank according to market 
capitalisation. Correlation (diversification) among assets in the portfolio is not 
calculated as we are not calculating VaR for investment purposes, and do not need to 
show the effect of portfolio diversification. Our total bank figures are  based on a 
weighted average of the underlying bank VaRs (for example the 95% daily VaR for 
the S&P/ASX200 Bank index which contains the largest 6 banks is 0.0302 during the 
GFC period compared to a weighted average for the same banks of 0.0337, the 
difference being that the index is based on a diversified portfolio of 6 banks as 
opposed to a weighted average of VaRs). The weighted average is a more meaningful 
figure to compare individual banks against. VaR is usually measured at high 
confidence levels, either 95% or 99%, with CVaR measured as the returns beyond 
VaR (5% or 1%). As the GFC period includes only 2 years with 250 daily returns 
each year, for a confidence level of 99%, CVaR historical figures would only 
encompass 2.5 returns for each of the 2 years, giving 5 returns in total for each bank. 
We have thus chosen CVaR at 5% (VaR 95%), which provides analysis of a 
reasonable number of extreme returns. For the parametric method, based on a normal 
distribution, we multiply the standard deviation by 1.645 to obtain VaR at the 95% 
confidence level. For the historical method, we calculate VaR as being the lowest 95
th
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percentile value over the period. For Monte Carlo we generate 20,000 random 
scenarios for the pre-GFC period (based on the pre-GFC distribution) and 20,000 for 
the post-GFC period (based on the post-GFC distribution), and then calculate VaR as 
the lowest 95
th
 percentile value for each period. For each of the 3 methods used, 
CVaR is calculated as the average of the returns beyond the VaR measure (the worst 
5%).     
 
4.3. Structural Methodology 
We apply Merton methodology per Section 3. Using equity returns and the 
relationship between equity and assets per section 3, we estimate an initial asset 
return. Daily log return is calculated and new asset values estimated for every day. 
Following KMV, this is repeated until asset returns converge. CVaR methodology is 
incorporated into the structural model to obtain CDD and CPD as per Section 3. 
 
4.4. Testing for size significance. 
We use 3 methods. Firstly, we test for correlation between size (natural logarithm of 
assets as per our regression equation discussed further on in this section) and our four 
risk measures.  
Secondly, we split our data into ‘major’ banks and ‘other’ banks and use F tests to 
compare share price volatility and market asset volatility between the two size 
categories,  testing for significance at both the 95% and 99% levels. We use $40 
billion market capitalisation as the cut-off point for defining a ‘major’ bank, as this 
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point ensures all regions 3 banks included in the comparison. Here we also examine 
the extent to which risk increased during the GFC period as compared to pre-GFC for 
‘major’ banks and for ‘other’ banks.   
Thirdly, we undertake a panel data regression analysis to ascertain whether size is a 
significant determinant of bank risk in conjunction with other variables. Using our 
risk measures as dependant variables, we undertake separate regressions for each of 
our four regions (Australia, Canada, Europe and US). We use a time (t) and bank (i) 
fixed effects model (confirmed via Hausman test to be the most appropriate option) 
with panel data for each bank for each of the years in our dataset (2000 -2008). 
Drawing on key prior studies we include the following variables: 
 
VaRit (or DDit)   =  β1Sizeit  + β2Equityit + β3ROEit + β4LAt + β5CLLit 
  + β6INTIit + β7NPLit + β8GVaRit + αi + εit (12)
   
Size is the natural logarithm of total balance sheet assets. Equity is total balance sheet 
equity / total balance sheet assets. ROE is net profit before tax / total balance sheet 
equity. LA, CLL and INTI are all measures of diversification. LA is total balance sheet 
loans / total balance sheet assets. CLL is commercial   (non-residential)  loans / total 
loans. INTI is gross interest income / total income. NPL is the percentage of non 
performing loans (sometimes referred to as  impaired assets) as a percentage of total 
loans. GVaR is Global Value at Risk which was applied to Australia and Canada 
only, to assess the contagion effect of major market volatility of Global Banks - the 
measure used was the combined VaR of Europe and US as determined in this study – 
(obviously the measure was not applied to US and Europe, being key global banking 
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industries themselves). Note that we also examined ROA as an alternative to ROE, 
and Tier 1 Capital ratio as an alternative to Equity ratio. We selected ROE and Equity 
as they provided a slightly better fit in term of R
2 
than the alternate measures, and to 
avoid multicollinearity we excluded the alternate measures. Also note that CLL was 
applied to Australia only, due to insufficient availability of this data for other regions. 
A variety of lags were applied to each of the variables, but no lagging of variables 
significantly improved any of the outcomes and lags are thus not reported. The results 
are shown in table 3. R
2
 is shown at 3 levels; firstly excluding NPL and GVaR, 
secondly excluding GVaR only, and thirdly including all variables. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
We found strong correlation (99% significance) between outcomes of the 3 different 
VaR and CVaR modelling techniques (parametric, historical and Monte Carlo), a key 
reason being our large number of historical observations, as well as the large number 
of forward simulations (20,000). As there is no significant difference between these 
methods, to avoid excessively detailed reporting we will restrict our discussion and 
tables to one method (parametric) for VaR and CVaR.  The correlations between size 
and risk are shown in Table 1. None of the correlations in any of the regions are 
significant, and the signs differ between regions with a negative relationship for 
Australia, Canada and Europe, as compared to positive for the US. 
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Table 1. Correlation between size and risk. 
The table correlates the four risk metrics, as described in 
sections 2 and 3, with Size (natural logarithm of total 
assets). It is expected that the signs for VaR/CVaR will be 
opposite to DD/CDD, because a higher VaR/CVar shows 
higher risk, whereas a higher DD/CCD shows lower risk. ** 
and * denote significance at the 99 and 95 percent levels 
respectively, whereas the absence of either of these 
indicators denotes no significance.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 splits the banks for all the regions into ‘major’ and ‘other’ banks and 
provides figures on VaR, CVaR, Stdev (asset value fluctuations) and CStdev (worst 
5% of asset value fluctuations). Stdev and CStdev are the denominators for the DD 
and CDD (equations 7 and 9). Thus a higher Stdev(Cstdev) will correspond to a 
proportionately equal lower DD/CDD. Given the high number of banks (over 4 
countries / regions) only ‘major’ bank figures are shown at individual level, with the 
‘other’ bank figures showing the weighted average for those banks. The table also 
splits the figures into Pre-GFC and GFC, thus showing which category of Banks 
experienced greater change in risk between the two periods.  
  
VaR CVaR DD CDD
Australia -0.181 -0.204 0.052 0.230
Canada -0.067 -0.119 0.082 0.205
EU -0.033 -0.028 0.081 0.076
US 0.030 0.032 -0.034 -0.028
All -0.017 -0.015 0.054 0.021
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Table 2. Risk measures for ‘major’ banks compared to ‘other’ banks. 
VaR is calculated on a parametric basis, whereby the standard deviation of daily returns is multiplied 
by 1.645 (95% confidence level based on a normal distribution). Annual VaR can be obtained by 
multiplying Daily VaR by the square root of 250. Figures are undiversified and represent the weighted 
average of the individual bank VaRs. CVaR is calculated as the average of the worst 5% of actual 
returns (those beyond the 95% VaR).  The GFC category calculates daily VaR for the 2 years from 
2007 and 2008.  The GFC category calculates daily VaR for the 7 year period from 2000-2006. 
‘Major’ banks for the purposes of this table are defined as all banks with market capitalization 
exceeding USD $40billion. The four columns on the right of the table show the increases (GFC as 
compared to pre-GFC) in VaR, CVaR Asset Stdev and Asset CStdev. Market asset value of returns 
(Stdev) is calculated as the standard deviation of all asset returns for the period, whereas CStdev is 
based on the worst 5%. F testing is undertaken to test for variance in volatility. F is σ21/ σ22, where σ1 
and σ2 are the standard deviations of returns for the two samples being compared. An F value of 1 
shows no difference between the samples and a value of 3 shows variance of 3x higher in the one 
sample compared to the other. * denotes significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
 
 
 
Australian Banks
Market Cap 
USD $m
Daily 
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
Stdev
Daily 
Cstdev
ANZ 54,366        0.0192 0.0261 0.0351 0.0630 1.83 2.41 2.25 2.48
COMMONWEALTH 52,468        0.0181 0.0253 0.0308 0.0516 1.71 2.03 1.69 1.72
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA 56,071        0.0205 0.0296 0.0361 0.0587 1.76 1.98 2.07 2.07
WESTPAC 68,424        0.0186 0.0252 0.0327 0.0537 1.76 2.13 2.32 2.16
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 231,330      0.0191 0.0265 0.0337 0.0566 1.76 2.14 2.09 2.11
OTHER BANKS (6) 33,097        0.0249 0.0432 0.0420 0.0717 1.69 1.66 1.90 1.95
TOTAL 264,427      0.0198 0.0286 0.0347 0.0585 1.75 2.05 2.01 2.08
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
GFC / Pre GFC - Major Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - Pre GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 3.1150 4.5588 4.3681 4.4352 1.7079 2.6517 1.2873 1.6077
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
GFC / Pre GFC - Other Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 2.8431 2.7578 3.6100 3.8025 1.5588 1.6041 1.3687 1.1669
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0002 0.0425
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** *
Canadian Banks
Market Cap 
USD $m
Daily 
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
Stdev
Daily 
Cstdev
BK.OF NOVA SCOTIA 44,523        0.0225 0.0323 0.0366 0.0561 1.63 1.74 1.54 1.58
ROYAL BANK CANADA 74,466        0.0214 0.0317 0.0380 0.0602 1.77 1.90 1.59 1.70
TORONTO-DOMINION 50,852        0.0234 0.0336 0.0362 0.0572 1.54 1.70 1.35 1.47
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 169,841      0.0223 0.0324 0.0371 0.0582 1.66 1.80 1.50 1.60
OTHER BANKS (6) 60,969        0.0228 0.0330 0.0406 0.0625 1.79 1.90 1.70 1.69
TOTAL 230,810      0.0224 0.0326 0.0380 0.0594 1.69 1.82 1.54 1.61
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
GFC / Pre GFC - Major Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - Pre GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 2.7659 3.2267 2.2380 2.5472 1.0409 1.0336 2.6102 2.6706
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.2010 0.2448 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** - - ** **
GFC / Pre GFC - Other Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 3.1899 3.5935 2.9036 2.8460 1.2024 1.1516 2.0143 2.3838
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0199 0.0576 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** * - ** **
VaR/CVaR 
increase (times)
Asset Value 
Fluctuation increase 
(times)Pre-GFC GFC
Pre-GFC GFC
VaR/CVaR 
increase (times)
Asset Value 
Fluctuation increase 
(times)
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Table 2 (continued). 
 
 
 
European Banks
Market 
Cap USD 
$m
Daily    
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily    
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily    
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
Stdev
Daily 
Cstdev
BANCO SANTANDER 121,617   0.0335 0.0482 0.0430 0.0699 1.28 1.45 1.52 1.64
BARCLAYS 48,519    0.0322 0.0473 0.0651 0.1018 2.02 2.15 3.84 4.17
BNP PARIBAS 84,755    0.0313 0.0476 0.0503 0.0812 1.61 1.70 2.68 2.92
CREDIT SUISSE 76,650    0.0393 0.0620 0.0607 0.1006 1.54 1.62 2.08 2.16
HSBC 192,500   0.0241 0.0369 0.0354 0.0588 1.47 1.60 1.68 1.90
LLOYDS TSB 50,130    0.0310 0.0455 0.0617 0.0985 1.99 2.16 3.00 2.93
SOCIETE GENERALE 45,040    0.0350 0.0511 0.0575 0.0873 1.64 1.71 2.49 2.52
UBS 72,326    0.0291 0.0435 0.0658 0.1072 2.26 2.46 3.36 3.64
UNICREDIT 50,240    0.0267 0.0411 0.0544 0.0933 2.03 2.27 3.35 3.88
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 741,777   0.0303 0.0456 0.0503 0.0818 1.66 1.79 2.05 2.22
OTHER BANKS (7) 153,969   0.0340 0.0523 0.0653 0.1118 1.92 2.14 3.61 3.92
TOTAL 895,746   0.0310 0.0468 0.0529 0.0869 1.71 1.86 2.15 2.34
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
GFC / Pre GFC - Major Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - Pre GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset  
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 2.7459 3.2146 4.2014 4.9261 1.2582 1.3162 8.5943 7.0611
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
GFC / Pre GFC - Other Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset  
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 3.6873 4.5682 13.0506 15.3323 1.6896 1.8705 2.7668 2.2686
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
US Banks
Market 
Cap USD 
$m
Daily    
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily    
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily    
VaR
Daily 
CVaR
Daily 
Stdev
Daily 
Cstdev
BANK OF AMERICA 130,273   0.0268 0.0407 0.0778 0.1326 2.91 3.26 6.04 8.34
CITIGROUP 94,280    0.0306 0.0462 0.0895 0.1566 2.92 3.39 6.04 7.64
JP MORGAN 154,621   0.0361 0.0549 0.0666 0.1075 1.84 1.96 2.09 2.33
US BANCORP 43,062    0.0294 0.0460 0.0479 0.0756 1.63 1.64 1.95 2.09
WELLS FARGO 139,771   0.0213 0.0316 0.0648 0.1019 3.05 3.22 3.28 4.02
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 562,006   0.0288 0.0437 0.0711 0.1177 2.47 2.69 3.22 3.93
OTHER BANKS (46) 125,900   0.0241 0.0361 0.0638 0.1024 2.65 2.84 3.06 3.59
TOTAL 687,906   0.0279 0.0423 0.0698 0.1149 2.50 2.72 3.19 3.86
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
GFC / Pre GFC - Major Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - Pre GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset  
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 6.0948 7.2621 10.3795 15.4100 1.4353 1.4624 1.3362 1.1596
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0010
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
GFC / Pre GFC - Other Banks Other Banks / Major Banks - GFC 
VaR CVaR
Asset  
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev VaR CVaR
Asset 
Stdev
Asset 
Cstdev
F 7.0377 8.0475 9.3722 12.8910 1.2430 1.3197 1.2066 1.0308
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0076 0.0010 0.0181 0.3673
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** * -
Pre-GFC GFC
VaR/ CVaR 
increase (times)
Asset Value 
Fluctuation increase 
(times)
Asset Value 
Fluctuation increase 
(times)
VaR/ CVaR 
increase (times)GFCPre-GFC
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Among the ‘majors’, Barclays, UBS, Unicredit, Bank of America, Citigroup and 
Wells Fargo stand out as having high VaR, CVAR and asset value fluctuations during 
the GFC. These are all entities which featured prominently in the GFC among those 
banks which suffered problems such as large losses, capital shortages, and substantial 
writedowns of investments in subprime mortgages. Overall, there is no clear pattern 
emerging as to differences in the risk measurements between ‘major’ and ‘other’ 
banks. In Australia, ‘major’ banks tend to have lower VaR, CVaR, Stdev, and CStdev 
figures than ‘other’ Banks. Both groups have significantly worse figures for all these 
4 indicators during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC (significant difference at 99% 
confidence level using an F test), however the extent of the increase in tail risk was 
actually larger for the ‘majors’ (2.14x for CVaR and 2.11x for CStdev) than for 
‘other’ (1.66x for CVaR and 1.95x for CStdev), which is opposite to the increases 
seen in Canada and Europe. The significance of the differential between CStdev for 
the ‘major’ banks and the ‘other’ banks in Australia falls from the 99% level pre-GFC 
to the 95% level during the GFC period. In Canada there is a significant differential 
in asset value fluctuations between ‘other’ and ‘major’ banks both pre and during the 
GFC, but there is no significant difference between the two groups of banks in VaR 
and CVaR. In Europe ‘other’ banks are more risky than ‘majors’ on all measures with 
this differential increasing during the GFC. In the US, the increase in all measures 
was fairly similar for ‘majors’ and ‘other’ banks, with GFC asset value fluctuations 
being similar across both groups. It should be noted of course, that as we are looking 
at asset value fluctuations our study only includes listed groups, and (with the notable 
exception of Lehman Brothers) the large number of financial institution failures are 
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predominantly smaller unlisted entities. If we consider all 4 regions as a whole, the 
large increases in our risk measurements (from Pre-GFC to GFC) are widespread (but 
to a lesser degree in Canada and Australia), across all categories of banks in our 
study. Larger banks experienced significant difficulties such as access to wholesale 
funding (all regions), writedown of investments in sub-prime mortgages (mainly US 
and Europe), and exposure to corporate loan losses (all regions). Many smaller 
entities also had problems accessing funding. These entities generally also had 
relatively large exposures to the home loan market which was impacted by rising 
unemployment and falling house prices, particularly in the US and Europe. Many of 
the smaller banks also had large exposures to a falling commercial property market.   
Thus all categories of banks, small and large, experienced problems during the GFC.   
Table 3 shows the results of our fixed effects panel regression analysis as per the 
methodology described in Section 4.4. The discussion following the tables will show 
that Size is not a significant determinant of risk and that other independent variables, 
particularly NPL and GVaR, are much more significant than Size.  
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Table 3.  Determinants of VaR and DD 
 
The table shows regression results with VaR (first two numerical columns) and DD (next two 
numerical columns) as the dependant variables. The regression includes panel data for all the years in 
our dataset from  with bank and time fixed effects.  Dependant Variables are shown in the first column. 
Independent variables are defined in the paragraph preceding the table. */**/*** denote significance at 
the 90/95/99 percent levels respectively. R
2
 is shown in the final two columns of the table for VaR and 
DD respectively. The uppermost R
2
 for each region includes all independent variables except NPL. 
The next R
2 
includes all the prior variables plus NPL. The final  R
2
 includes all the independent 
variables, plus GVaR (which is the combined VaR figure for US and UK, and has been included to 
assess the impact of global events in major regions on the smaller regions of Australia and Canada). 
 
Australia R2 VaR R2DD
Coeff. t Coeff. t
Size -0.0663 -1.449 0.9236 0.754 0.441 0.737
Equity -0.7592 -3.402 *** 15.8077 2.647 ***
ROE -0.7427 -0.504 4.7680 1.209
LA -0.0494 -0.152 -13.6124 -1.568 0.776 0.798
CLL 0.1240 0.524 -3.4287 -0.542
INTI 0.0040 0.634 0.1113 0.655
NPL 0.5870 8.925 *** -10.8868 -6.186 ***
Constant 1.2450 1.674 * 9.0056 0.452 0.813 0.827
Canada R2 VaR R2DD
Coeff. t Coeff. t 0.401 0.551
Size -0.0135 -1.091 2.146 1.017
Equity -4.1847 -1.263 10.477 0.085
ROE -0.1681 -0.613 -10.587 -1.038 0.513 0.677
LA 0.3743 1.027 2.598 0.192
INTI 1.0656 3.791 *** -57.804 -5.531 ***
NPL 0.1705 4.050 *** -8.443 -5.395 ***
Constant -5.8250 -5.125 *** 94.187 2.299 ** 0.913 0.702
Europe R2 VaR R2DD
Coeff. t Coeff. t
Size -0.1002 -1.109 0.2218 1.616
Equity -0.0670 -0.178 65.1909 1.689 * 0.545 0.711
ROE -0.4848 -5.104 *** 5.0470 5.205 ***
LA -0.0001 -4.326 *** 43.4176 3.048 ***
INTI 0.2105 1.634 13.2153 0.143 0.662 0.737
NPL 0.0975 11.930 *** -0.3126 -3.048 ***
Constant -1.2538 -1.261 -65.8790 -1.635
US R2 VaR R2DD
Coeff. t Coeff. t
Size 0.0384 0.768 -4.1826 -1.587
Equity -2.3744 -3.342 *** 94.9249 2.534 ** 0.581 0.780
ROE -1.0702 -10.700 *** 25.6314 4.836 ***
LA -0.4216 -2.635 *** 27.2796 3.234 ***
INTI -0.2320 -1.332 1.4394 -0.157 0.785 0.791
NPL 0.1093 18.300 *** -1.3594 -4.264 ***
Constant 0.3963 0.444 -83.1721 -1.770 *
VaR
DDVaR
DD
DDVaR
Excluding 
NPL
Including 
NPL
Including 
NPL & 
GVaR
DDVaR
Including 
NPL
Excluding 
NPL
Excluding 
NPL
Including 
NPL
Including 
NPL & 
GVaR
Excluding 
NPL
Including 
NPL
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For all regions, the results show that size is not a significant item for any of the four 
regions. Indeed, the model for all other independent variables excluding NPL and 
GVaR does not provide a good explanation for VaR with R
2
 ranging between only 
0.40 (Canada) and 0.58 (US) but a better explanation for DD ranging from 0.55 
(Canada) to 0.78 (US). This increases substantially when including NPL, with VaR  
ranging from 0.51 (Canada) to 0.79 (US) and DD ranging from 0.68 (Canada) to 0.79 
(US). R
2
 increases further for Australia (VaR 0.81, DD 0.83) and Canada (VaR 0.91, 
DD 0.70) when including GVaR. Although, on its own GVaR is a significant indicator 
of Australian VaR and DD, when including NPL, significant R
2
 can be generated 
from the characteristics of these banks themselves. The findings are generally 
consistent with the studies mentioned earlier in this section which found that (NPL 
aside) balance sheet and income statement factors are not a good indicator of bank 
risk and that external shocks caused by global contagion (as measured by GVaR in 
our study) can have a significant impact.  
Across all regions, NPL is a significant determinant of VaR and PD. Equity (Australia 
and US) and LA (Europe and US) are significant in two regions each, but not in the 
other regions. In the US and UK,  ROE is more significant than in Australia and 
Canada, likely because US and UK banks had significant losses over these volatile 
times, in line with VaR increases, whereas Australian and Canadian Banks remained 
profitable.     
There is consistency in signs (+ or -) for all 4 regions for ROE and Equity (profitable 
banks with higher equity showing less risk), but no consistency among other 
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variables. For example, Size is positively related to risk for the US but negatively for 
other regions.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Neither correlation nor regression analysis show significance in association between 
size and risk. When splitting banks into ‘major’ banks and ‘other’ banks, size does 
have some significance, but the signs vary between regions. Thus, overall, the study 
finds no conclusive evidence of association between size and risk. 
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